Competition and privatization amidst weak institutions: Evidence from Mongolia

James H. Anderson, Young Lee, Peter Murrell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Mongolia's mass privatization program was implanted in a country that lacked the very basic institutions of capitalism. This paper examines the effects of competition and ownership on the efficiency of the newly privatized enterprises, using a representative sample of enterprises and controlling for possible selection biases. Competition has quantitatively large effects; perfectly competitive firms having nearly double the efficiency of monopolies. Enterprises with residual state ownership appear to be more efficient than other enterprises, reflecting an environment where the government was pressured to focus on efficiency and institutions gave little voice to outsider owners.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)527-549
Number of pages23
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume38
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2000 Jan 1

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Privatization
Mongolia
Government
State ownership
Selection bias
Outsider
Owners
Monopoly
Ownership
An enterprise
Capitalism

Cite this

Anderson, James H. ; Lee, Young ; Murrell, Peter. / Competition and privatization amidst weak institutions : Evidence from Mongolia. In: Economic Inquiry. 2000 ; Vol. 38, No. 4. pp. 527-549.
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Competition and privatization amidst weak institutions : Evidence from Mongolia. / Anderson, James H.; Lee, Young; Murrell, Peter.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 4, 01.01.2000, p. 527-549.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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