A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

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7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the design of full return contract in a simple supply chain with a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. In this problem, the ordering quantity and the rebate price for unsold products are determined by the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. We propose an optimal solution procedure in centralized and decentralized decision making environments considering when the information sharing among the retailer and the manufacturer is partial. We provide numerical examples to explain the proposed solution procedures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)110-115
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Journal of Production Economics
Volume136
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012 Mar 1

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Supply chains
Decision making
Information sharing
Retailers
Partial information
Rebates
Supply chain
Optimal solution
Decentralized decision making

Keywords

  • Alternating Direction Method
  • Information sharing
  • Supply chain coordination

Cite this

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